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A Hierarchical Secure Routing Protocol against Black Hole Attacks
in Sensor Networks*
Jian Yin and Sanjay Kumar Madria
Department of Computer Science, University of Missouri-Rolla, MO 65401, USA
{jian, madrias}@umr.edu
Abstract
A black hole attack is a severe attack that can be
easily employed against routing in sensor networks. In
a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously
announces a short route to the sink node (the
destination) to attract additional traffic to the
malicious node and then drops them. In this paper, we
propose a hierarchical secure routing protocol for
detecting and defending against black hole attacks. The
proposed protocol uses only symmetric key
cryptography to discover a safe route against black
hole attacks. The comparison of the proposed protocol
with two other existing approaches proves that the
proposed scheme is faster in detecting black hole
attacks with much lower message overhead.
Keywords Black hole attack, Sensor networks

1. Introduction
Many sensor network applications, such as border
security application [1], run in untrustworthy
environments, which require secure communication [24] against different types of attacks. However,
traditional security protocols [5] are designed for
resource rich machines with large computation, which
are not applicable to sensor networks due to resource
limitation. Secure routing in sensor networks presents
challenges due to low computing power, small memory,
limited bandwidth, and especially very limited energy
[6]. A black hole attack [5] is a severe attack that can
be easily employed against routing in sensor networks.
In a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously
announces a short route to the sink node in order to
attract additional traffic to the malicious node and then
drops them. The black hole attack forms a serious
threat as data packets are dropped by the black hole
node.
In this paper, a hierarchical secure routing protocol
(HSRBH) for detecting and defending against black
hole attacks is presented. It uses only symmetric key
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cryptography to discover a safe route against black
hole attacks. In the HSRBH protocol, the sensor
network is divided into different groups with one group
leader in each group through the localized selforganization process. Group members are organized in
a tree structure with a group leader as the root. An
intra-group shared key among the neighbors of the
group leader and an inter-group shared key between the
two neighboring group leaders are established. Most of
the black hole attacks are detected only locally. To
detect the black hole attacks which are caused by the
cooperation between the group leader and its neighbor,
the randomized data acknowledgement scheme is
proposed. The proposed HSRBH protocol is robust
against black hole attacks. Comparing with the two
existing schemes AODVBH [5] and CoBH [7], the
HSRBH scheme detects the black holes faster while
establishing the route with much lower communication
overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives a motivating example. Section 3
presents the system model. Section 4 describes the
HSRBH protocol. Section 5 gives the theoretical
analysis. Section 6 provides the performance
evaluations. Section 7 gives related work, and section 8
concludes the paper.

2. Motivating Example
In the border security application, sensor nodes are
deployed along the border area, which monitor the
border and send the information only if they detect new
events such as people crossing the border. Heidemann
et al. [8] mentioned that ad hoc routing such as AODV
and DSR can be used in sensor networks. However, the
table driven scheme [9] is energy consuming since the
route update must be done frequently. That’s the reason
our HSRBH scheme uses on-demand routing scheme.

2.1. Problem Statement
In a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously
announces a short route to the sink node in order to
attract additional traffic to it and then drops them. It
sends route replies immediately after receiving the
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route request even though it does not have any route. If
the route reply from the malicious node reaches the
source node earlier, the source node establishes the
route to the sink node through the malicious node.
Normally the route reply from the malicious node can
have more chances to be accepted by the source node.
The black hole attack forms a serious threat as data
packets are dropped by the black hole node.

3. System Model
This section provides the system model based on
the system description, localized self-organization and
key establishment.

3.1. System Description
Two types of sensor nodes are deployed in the sensor
network [10]: level-0 and level-1 sensor nodes. The
level-1 nodes are manually deployed [11]. The
distribution of level-1 nodes is roughly uniform. The
number of level-1 nodes is 10-20% of the total number
of sensor nodes. We assume that all the level-0 and
level-1 nodes are preloaded with a global initial key K0
in memory. Besides, each node holds its individual
secret key shared with the sink node. Each node has a
unique identity (ID) and a preloaded pseudo-random
function f [4]. We assume that the sink node is secure
and trusted, whereas all other sensor nodes can be
compromised. However, we assume there is a lower
bound on the time interval Tmin (about several seconds
[4]) that is necessary for an adversary to compromise a
node. Table 1 provides the notation description.
Table 1. Notation description
Notation
Description
A, B
M1|M2
KAB
KA
MAC(K,M)
EK(M)
fK(u)
NA
IDA

Principles, such as sensor nodes
The concatenation of messages M1 and M2
The secret shared key shared between A and
B
The secret key held by A
The message authentication code of
message M using a symmetric key K [12]
Encryption of message M with key K [13]
A pseudo-random function with inputs of
symmetric key K and the identity of node u
A nonce generated by node A, which is a
random number
The identity of node A

3.2. Localized Self-Organization
The level-1 nodes as the group leaders start the
localized self-organization by sending a hello message
<IDG|NG|MAC(K0,IDG|NG)>, where IDG is the group
leader’s ID, and NG is a nonce. Each node (say node A)
only accepts the first verified hello message through
MAC. The receiver A sets the sender as its parent. It

then sends a reply message <IDA|IDG|NG|
MAC(K0,IDA|IDG|NG)> to the sender. It also broadcasts
the updated hello message <IDA|IDG|NA|MAC(K0,
IDA|IDG|NA)>. The group leader accepts the verified
reply message through MAC and sets the node A as its
child. This process is recursively continued. When a
sensor node receives a hello message, it must decide
whether it stops broadcasting it. If it has received a
hello message from other group leaders earlier, it stops
broadcasting. After a certain time, it reports its all
group leaders about all other group leader’s ID. Then
the localized self-organization process ends. After the
localized self-organization process, group members are
organized in a tree structure with the group leader as
the root. The information stored in each group leader
includes (a) one-hop neighbors’ ID, and (b) its
neighbor group leader’s ID. The information stored in
other sensor nodes includes (a) parent node’s ID, (b)
child node’s ID, and (c) group leader’s ID.

3.3. Key Establishment
This section provides inter-group shared key
establishment between two neighboring group leaders
and intra-group shared key establishment among the
one-hop neighbors of the group leader.
3.3.1. Inter-group Shared Key Establishment. First,
the group leader derives its own secret key f K 0 ID [4].
Second, it derives its neighboring group leaders’ secret
key f K 0 ID , where ID is its neighboring group
leaders’ ID. Third, it establishes the inter-group shared
key with its neighboring group leaders. Let node A0
and B0 be group leaders. The shared key KAB
establishment is as follows. If IDA0 t IDB0 , node A0
computes the pair-wise shared key K AB
Node

B0

computes

KAB

as

IEEE

0

f K B ID A0
0

independently. Fourth, after a specified time (much less
than Tmin), all sensor nodes other than the sink node
remove K0, f and all secret keys of other nodes.
3.3.2. Intra-group Shared Key Establishment. The
group leader sends the message {ID|IDR|MAC(K0,
ID|IDR)} to its one-hop neighbors, where IDR is a
random ID. The neighbors then verify the
authentication of the message through MAC. Then the
neighbors establish the intra-group shared key f K 0 IDR .
Finally, the group leader A0 removes the initial key K0,
the random function f, and random identity IDR.
Therefore, only the neighbors of the group leader share
the intra-group shared key.
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4. Secure Routing Protocol against Black
Hole Attacks
This section provides the HSRBH protocol. We
first give an overview (Section 4.1) and then provide
the detailed protocol (Section 4.2).

4.1. An Overview
After the localized self-organization and key
establishment process, the sensor network is divided
into groups. Each group has a group leader. An intragroup shared key among neighbors of the group leader
and an inter-group shared key between the two
neighboring group leaders are established.
In the HSRBH protocol, the source node initiates
the route discovery process through sending a route
request (RREQ) to the sink node. When the sink node
or an intermediate group leader having a fresh enough
route receives the RREQ, it generates a route reply
(RREP) and sends it to the source node. Each RREP
includes the message authentication code (MAC)
which is calculated using the inter-group shared key.
For each RREP packet, two verification steps are
executed as follows. First step, the neighbor of the
group leader who generates the RREP packet must
make the verification through sending a further
verification message to the next hop of the group leader
on the route to the sink node. The further verification
message includes a MAC, which is calculated using
intra-group shared key. The next hop receiving the
verification message sends the verification result to the
sender. If the verification succeeds, the node forwards
the RREP packet to its previous node. Otherwise, if the
verification fails or the node did not get the verification
result within a certain time, the node drops the RREP
packet. Second step, the neighboring group leader
receiving the RREP packet must verify the
authentication of the RREP packet through MAC since
only the two neighboring group leaders share their
inter-group shared key. If the verification succeeds, the
neighboring group leader forwards the RREP packet to
its previous node. Otherwise, it must drop it.
The nodes between two neighboring group leaders
send the RREP packet immediately after receiving the
RREQ packet even though they do not have any route
to make the black hole attack. These attacks can be
locally detected using the two verification steps.
The most challenging black hole attack is made by
the collusion between the group leader and other nodes.
The black hole node’s goal is to drop the packets. We
use the randomized data acknowledgement mechanism
to detect this attack. In this mechanism, the source
node randomly sends the control message to the sink
node to send the acknowledgement. The
acknowledgement includes the MAC using the shared

key between the source node and the sink node. If the
source node can receive the acknowledgement and the
verification succeeds, the route is secure against the
black hole. Otherwise, the route is considered to have
a black hole node inside. Then the source node adds the
node generating the RREP to its black list. The source
node will not accept any RREP from the nodes in the
black list.
After the secure route discovery, each node on the
route has built the appropriate routing table, which
includes the next hop on the route to the sink node.

4.2. Protocol Description
This section gives a detailed description of HSRBH
including a route request process, a route reply process,
a data acknowledgement process, and a route
maintenance process.
4.2.1. Route Request. Source node (S) initiates the
route discovery by broadcasting RREQ as follows:
S o *:IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
where IDRREQ is a random number and Seq is the
sequence number. When the intermediate node (node I)
receives it, six cases will be considered:
Case 1: If the RREQ is not from its group leader and it
is not the parent of the sending node, it drops it.
Case 2: If the RREQ is not from its group leader but it
is the parent of the sending node, and if it has already
received the same packet, it drops it. If it has not
receive it, it updates its routing table to add IDsend, IDS,
IDsink and IDRREQ. Here IDsend is the ID of the sending
node. Then it sends the RREQ as follows:
I o *:IDI|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
Case 3: If the RREQ is originally from its group leader
and it is not the child of the sending node or it has
received the RREQ before, it drops it.
Case 4: If the RREQ is originally from its group leader
and it is the child of the sending node, and if it has not
received it before, it updates its routing table with
IDsend, IDS, IDsink and IDRREQ. Then it sends the RREQ:
I o *:IDI|IDG|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
Case 5: If it is the group leader which receives the
RREQ and if it has received it before, it drops it.
Case 6: If it is the group leader which receives the
RREQ and if it has not received it before, it checks its
routing table to determine whether it has a fresh
enough route. If it has a fresh route, it generates a
RREP to the source node S. If it has no fresh route, it
updates its routing table with IDsend, IDS, IDsink and
IDRREQ. Then it sends the updated RREQ as follows:
G o *:IDG|IDs|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
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When the sink node receives the RREQ, it derives
the source node S secret key K S f K 0 IDS . It only
accepts the RREQ with the valid MAC, which first
reaches it. If Seq is bigger than the same route stored in
its routing table, it updates the routing table to store IDS,
IDRREQ, Seq, and the previous group leader’s ID.
Finally, it sends the RREP to the source node.
4.2.2. Route Reply. As shown in Figure 1, if the sink
node generates a RREP, it sends the RREP as follows:
Sink o C: IDP|IDC|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(K<C, sink>, IDS| IDsink| IDRREQ| Seq|N|IDC)|
MAC(KS, IDS| IDsink| IDRREQ|Seq|N)
where IDP is the ID of the previous node, IDC is the ID
of the previous group leader and K<C, sink> is the intergroup shared key between C and the sink node.
If the intermediate group leader generates a RREP
packet, it sends the RREP packet as follows:
C o B: IDP|IDB|IDC| IDC2 | IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(KBC, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N| IDC2 |IDC|IDB)|
where IDP is the ID of the previous node, IDB is the ID
of the previous group leader B, IDC is the ID of the
sending group leader C, IDC2 is the ID of the next node
C2.
When the previous node of the group leader
receives the RREP generated by the group leader, it
sends a verification message to the next hop of the
group leader as follows:
C1 o C2: IDC1 | IDC2 | IDS|IDsink| Seq|
MAC( K C1C2 , IDS| IDsink| Seq| IDC1 | IDC2 )
where IDC1 is the ID of the previous node, IDC2 is the
ID of the next hop, and K C1C2 is the intra-group key
among the neighbors of the group leader C.
The next hop of the group leader sends the
verification result to the previous node of the group
leader as follows:
C2 o C1: IDC1 | IDC2 |IDS|IDsink|Seq|Rverify|MAC( K C1C2 ,
IDS| IDsink| Seq| IDC1 | IDC2 |Rverify)
Where Rverify is the result of verification. If C2 has fresh
enough route to sink, Rverify is YES. Otherwise, it is NO.
If the verification result is NO, the next hop of the
group leader has no fresh enough route and node C1
drops the RREP. If the verification result is YES, the
next hop of the group leader has a fresh route. Then the
RREP is sent to the previous node. The intermediate
node receiving it updates its routing table.
When the group leader receives the RREP, it
verifies the first MAC to make sure it is from the next
group leader. If the verification fails, it drops it. If the
ID of the previous group leader embedded in the RREP
is not the ID of the current group leader, it drops it.
Otherwise, it updates its routing table. Then, if the

RREP is originally from the sink node, the group leader
sends the RREP as follows (in Figure 1):
B o A: IDB1 |IDA|IDB| IDB2 |IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(KAB|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N| IDB2 |IDB|IDA)|
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N)
where IDB1 is the ID of the previous node B1, A and B
are the neighboring group leaders, and IDB2 is the ID
of the next node B2.
If the RREP is originally from the intermediate
group leader C, it sends the RREP as follows:
B o A: IDB1 |IDA|IDB| IDB2 |IDC|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(KAB,IDC|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N| IDB2 |IDB|IDA)|
where IDB1 is the ID of the previous node B1, A and B
are the neighboring group leaders, IDB2 is the ID of the
next node B2, and IDC is the ID of the node who
generates the RREP.
S

A
Group Leader

C1 C C2 Sink
B1 B B2
Neighbor of Group Leader Sensor

Figure 1. Route discovery
When the source node receives the RREP, it
verifies the first MAC. If the RREP has not been
tampered with, the source node inserts the ID of the
next hop on the route and the ID of the node who
generates the RREP packet to its routing table. If the
source node cannot receive the RREP within a
specified period, it triggers another route discovery.
4.2.3.
Data
Acknowledgement.
The
data
acknowledgement mechanism is used to detect the
black hole attack due to the collusion between the
group leader and other nodes. It is designed based on
the observation that the black hole node will drop the
data packets during the data dissemination process. The
data acknowledgement mechanism includes two phases:
control
message
forwarding
phase,
data
acknowledgement phase.
Control Message Forwarding Source node sends the
data packets to the sink node at a message rate Rd. Here
the message rate is defined as the number of the
messages per minute. It also sends control message to
the sink node at a message rate Rc. Rc can be changed
within a small range randomly and is designed much
smaller than Rd to decrease message overhead. The
control message includes the information to ask the
sink node to send the acknowledgement, which is
carefully crafted. For example, the control message can
be of the same size as of data packet. It is encrypted.
The control message is sent as follows:
S o Sink: IDN|IDC|IDS|IDsink|NS| E K S M |
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|NS| E K S M )
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where, IDN is the ID of the next hop on the route, and
node C is the group leader generating the RREP.
Data Acknowledgement The sink node sends the
acknowledgement as follows:
Sink o S: IDP|IDS|IDsink|NS|NSink|
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|NS|NSink)
Here, IDP is the ID of the previous hop in the route.
If the source node receives the acknowledgement
and passes the verification through MAC, the route is
secure against black hole attack. Only the sink node
can create the correct MAC using KS since only the
source node and the sink node holds the source node’s
secret key KS. If the verification fails, the source node
will suspect that the route may not be secure against
black hole attacks. To further confirm this judgment,
the source node sends further control messages more
frequently at a message rate Rcc (Rc< Rcc <Rd). If it can
not get the correct acknowledgement within a threshold
time, the source node can be sure that the route is not
secure against black hole attacks. It then adds the group
leader which generates the RREP into black hole list. If
it can successfully receive the data acknowledgement
within a threshold time, the route is secure against
black hole attacks.
Note that messages could be lost either because of
the black hole attack or because of the collision. But
we assume in this paper that collision could be handled
[14]. For example, the sending node can resend the
data packets when it finds that the data packet is lost
because of the collision. But the black hole node will
not send the data packets again after it drops them
since its objective is to drop the packets to disrupt the
sensor network.
4.2.4. Route Maintenance. If a sensor node wants to
send data to the sink node and there is no route
information in its routing table, it initiates the route
discovery. If the source node gets the error message
after it sends data or routing packet, or the threshold
time for the data acknowledgement is expired, or run
out of the specified waiting time from the last route
discovery, it triggers another route discovery. It never
accepts RREP generated by the group leader in its
black hole list.

5. Theoretical Analysis
This section gives security analysis against
different types of black hole attacks, and cost analysis.

5.1. Security Analysis
In our sensor network architecture, four types of
black hole attacks could occur: (1) A single node other
than the group leader makes the black hole attack; (2)

Several nodes between two neighboring group leaders
collude to make the black hole attack; (3) A single
group leader makes the black hole attack; (4) The
group leader colludes with its neighbors to make the
black hole attack.
5.1.1. Single Node other than the Group Leader
Makes the Black Hole Attack. In Figure 2, node S is
the source node, nodes A and B are the neighboring
group leaders. When the malicious node M1 receives
the RREQ, it immediately sends the RREP to node A
even it does not have fresh route to the sink. In our
secure routing protocol, group leader A receives the
RREP and verifies whether the RREP is from its
neighboring group leader. Only group leader B or A
can generate the correct RREP with MAC calculated
using KAB since only group leader A and its
neighboring group leader B shares an inter-group
shared key KAB. If M1 generates the RREP after it
receives the RREQ, the group leader A can detect it
immediately through the verification of MAC.
S

A
B
M1 M2
Group Leader
Malicious Node

Figure 2. Black hole attack
5.1.2. Multiple Nodes between Two Neighboring
Group Leaders Collude to Make a Black Hole
Attack. In [5], the author wants to detect whether
RREP is from the black hole node by sending further
RREQ to its next hop node M2. But if the next hop
node M2 is also a malicious node, called a colluding
black hole attack, the [5] does not provide any solution
to this problem. Our secure routing protocol can detect
this kind of colluding black hole attack where several
malicious nodes collude to act as black holes between
two neighboring group leaders. This is because the
group leader A can verify RREP through MAC using
the shared key KAB, which is shared between two group
leaders A and B.
5.1.3. Single Group Leader Makes the Black Hole
Attack. The HSRBH protocol can detect this kind of
attack using local verification. When one of the group
leader’s neighbors receives the RREP, it verifies the
authenticity of the route from the next hop of the group
leader in the path to the sink. If the group leader is part
of the black hole attack, the verification result will be
“NO”. This verification result can not be tampered by
the group leader since it does not have the intra-shared
key of its neighbors. The spoofed RREP will not be
forwarded to the next group leader by the node that had
received the RREP earlier.
5.1.4. Group Leader Colludes with its Neighbors to
Make a Black Hole Attack. The probability of this
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Sink
Sensor

kind of black hole attack is low since the attacker needs
special effort to conquer multiple nodes’ key. However,
our proposed secure routing protocol can also detect
this kind of attack through data acknowledgement
process. The source node randomly sends control
messages and waits for the data acknowledgement
from the sink node. The data acknowledgement is
signed through MAC using the source node’s secret
key, which is executed only by the source node or the
sink node since only they hold the source node’s secret
key.

5.2. Cost Analysis
This section gives the computational complexity
and storage overhead analysis. Define N as the total
number of sensor nodes, NG as the number of groups,
Nnb as the average number of neighboring groups for
each group leader, and M as the number of nodes to
make black hole attacks.
5.2.1. Computational Complexity. The worst case is
that none of group leaders have the fresh enough route
to the destination. The source node sends the RREQ
once to start the secure route discovery process, thus
the computational cost is O(1). Each intermediate
sensor node only accepts the first RREQ, then
broadcasts it, thus the total cost is O(N-2). The cost that
the sink node generates RREP is O(1). Since the
number of sensor nodes in one group is N/NG (<<N)
and the number of hops between two neighboring
group leaders is much smaller than N/NG, we can
assume the number of hops between two neighboring
group leaders is constant. We assume the total number
of hops along the route between the source node and
the sink node is NH, then the cost that RREP is
forwarded to the source node is O(NH), which is O(1)
since in general NH << N if the sensor nodes are
deployed in a rectangle region (length u breadth),
where length is not far away from breadth. The total
cost is O(N). The computational cost is not relevant to
the number of black holes since most of the black hole
attacks are detected only locally. However, the
computational cost of AODVBH [5] is 2( M  N ) . The
computational comlexity of CoBH [7] is 2( M  N ) . The
computational cost for both of AODVBH [5] and
CoBH [7] increases when the number of black hole
attacks increase.
5.2.2. Storage Overhead. In CoBH [7], each node
maintains an additional Data Routing Information (DRI)
table. Each node stores two additional bits in DRI for
each other node. The total additional storage for
maintaining DRI for each node is O(2N) bits, that is
O(N/4) bytes. If there are 1000 sensor nodes, each node
must maintain additional at least 256 bytes for DRI

storage. In the HSRBH, all the nodes maintain a shared
key with the sink node. Each group leaders also need to
maintain additional inter-group shared key with its
neighboring group leaders. All the one-hop neighbors
of the group leader also need to maintain additional
intra-group shared key. We assume the key size is Sk
bytes. The sensor node other than the group leader
need the additional key storage O(Sk). The group leader
needs the additional key storage including shared key
with the sink node and shared key with its neighboring
group leader, which is O((1+Nnb)Sk). The one-hop
neighbors of the group leader needs the additional key
storage including shared key with the sink node and
shared key with other one-hop neighbors of the group
leader, which is O(2Sk). If the key size is 8 bytes [2],
the node other than the group leader needs additional 8
bytes storage for key information. Assume that the
average number of neighboring group leaders for each
group leader is 6 then each group leader needs to
maintain additional 56 bytes for key storage. Each onehop neighbor of the group leader needs to maintain
additional 16 bytes for key storage.
In the sensor network, the storage is only 512 bytes
RAM, and 512 bytes EEPROM [2]. The HSRBH only
uses a small part of memory and thus it is suitable to be
used in the sensor network, whereas CoBH [7] needs
huge additional storage, which is not suitable for the
sensor network. AODVBH [5] does not need any
additional information, Therefore the storage overhead
is low. However, it only considers single black hole,
which is obviously not enough to build a secure route
against different kinds of black hole attacks including
cooperative black hole attacks.

6. Performance Evaluations
The metrics such as route discovery overhead and
black hole detection time are measured from the
simulation results. We evaluate the proposed HSRBH
by comparing it with AODVBH [5] and CoBH [7].

6.1.
Performance
Comparison:
Cooperative Black Holes

The message overhead to build a secure route
against multiple non cooperative black hole attacks is
shown in Figure 3. The message overhead in HSRBH
includes the message overhead in the initialization
phase and in the route discovery. The message
overhead in AODVBH and CoBH includes route
requests and route replies. The message overhead for
HSRBH is almost same when the number of black
holes increases, which is consistent with the
computation cost analysis result of O(N), where N is
the number of sensor nodes. But it is much lower than
the message overhead of the AODVBH scheme and
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a set of cooperative black holes except the group
leaders. But, for CoBH, the source node always sends
an additional route request to the next hop of the black
hole node until the next hop of the black hole is a
reliable node [7]. When the number of cooperative
black holes increases, more additional route discoveries
are triggered. Therefore, the message overhead in route
discovery in CoBH is much more than in HSRBH.
Message Overhead (106 bytes)
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CoBH scheme. This is because in HSRBH the black
hole node can be detected only locally. But, for both
AODVBH and CoBH, if the source node gets route
reply, it will send an additional route request to the
next hop of the black hole node to verify the route
reply. When the number of black holes increases, more
additional route discoveries are triggered, which is
consistent with the computation cost analysis result of
AODVBH and CoBH 2( M  N ) , where M is the
number of black hole nodes, and N is the total number
of sensor nodes.
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Figure 3. Route discoveries overhead
The average time to detect the black holes is shown
in Figure 4. HSRBH is faster to detect malicious nodes
acting as black holes than AODVBH and CoBH. This
is because in HSRBH the detection of black hole is
executed only locally. But in AODVBH or CoBH the
source node needs to send another route request to the
next hop of the intermediate node to verify the
authenticity of the route. This verification process
greatly delays the detection of the black hole node.
120
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Figure 5. Messages overhead during route
discovery
As shown in Figure 6, HSRBH is faster to detect
malicious nodes making cooperative black hole attacks
than CoBH. This is because in HSRBH the detection of
cooperative black holes is executed only. But in CoBH
if several nodes cooperatively make a black hole attack,
the source node sends another route request to the next
hop of the next hop of black hole node until it finds a
normal node with a route to the sink. Therefore, the
time to detect cooperative black holes increases with
the increase in the number of cooperative black holes.
This verification process in CoBH greatly delays the
detection of black hole.
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Figure 4. Average time to detect black hole

6.2. Performance Comparison: Cooperative
Black Holes
The message overhead for HSRBH protocol is
much lower than the message overhead for CoBH
scheme as shown in Figure 5. This is because in
HSRBH the black hole nodes can be detected locally
whenever they are single nodes acting as black holes or
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Figure 6. Time to detect cooperative black
holes

7. Related Work
Perrig et al. [2] presented two security protocols,
SNEP and ȝTESLA. SNEP provides data
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data
freshness, while ȝTESLA provides authenticated
broadcast
for
severely
resource-constrained
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environments using a time-released key chain. Zhu et
al. [4] proposed localized encryption and authentication
protocol (LEAP) and established four types of keys for
each sensor node. Oliveira et al. [10] proposed a
solution for securing heterogeneous hierarchical sensor
network with an arbitrary number of levels. Deng et al.
[5] proposed a solution for the black hole problem in
AODV routing protocol. They allowed the intermediate
node to send a reply message if it had a fresh enough
route to the destination. But the intermediate node
could be a malicious node and could send route reply
even if it had no fresh enough route to the destination
to make a black hole attack. They proposed a solution
that the source node would send another route request
to the next hop of the intermediate node to verify the
authenticity of the route from the intermediate node to
the destination node. If the route exists, the
intermediate node is trusted; otherwise, the reply
message from the intermediate node is discarded.
Ramaswamy et al. [7] addressed the problem of
coordinated attack by multiple black holes acting in
group in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). They
proposed a technique using the Data Routing
Information (DRI) table to identify multiple black
holes cooperating with each other and discover a safe
route avoiding cooperative black hole attack.

8. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a hierarchical secure
routing protocol to detect and find a secure path against
black hole attacks in sensor networks. The protocol
uses only symmetric key cryptography to discover a
safe route against black hole attacks. Most of black
hole attacks except the group leader colludes with other
nodes to make black hole attack, are detected only
locally. Therefore, it is much faster in detecting the
black hole attacks, and the message overhead is very
low. The proposed protocol also provides the scheme
to detect the black hole attack caused by the group
leader colluding with other nodes. The simulation
results show that the proposed protocol has a much
better performance for secure route discovery against
black hole attacks in comparison with the secure
AODV against black hole presented in [5] and the
protocol given in [7] against cooperative black hole
attacks.
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